Token passthrough
An anti-pattern in which an MCP server accepts an access token that was not issued for it and forwards that token to a downstream API; the MCP specification forbids it.
It is tempting when you wrap an existing API. The client already has a token for the API, so the MCP server just copies the Authorization header onward and skips running its own OAuth. The MCP authorization spec says no, twice: servers "MUST NOT accept or transit any other tokens", and when a server calls upstream APIs, the upstream token "is a separate token, issued by the upstream authorization server. The MCP server MUST NOT pass through the token it received from the MCP client."
The security best practices give the reasons:
- Controls are skipped. Rate limits, validation and monitoring that depend on the token's audience no longer apply.
- Nobody can tell who called. The MCP server cannot tell its clients apart, and the downstream logs show a different identity from the one actually acting.
- A stolen token goes further. If several services accept the same token, compromising one opens the others, and the MCP server becomes a proxy for exfiltration.
The fix is audience binding. The client asks for a token for this MCP server (the RFC 8707 resource parameter), the server checks that it is the intended audience, and any upstream call uses a second token issued for that upstream.
Example
A client sends Authorization: Bearer <token for api.tracker.example> to mcp.tracker.example. A passthrough server forwards it as is. A correct server rejects it with 401, because the token's audience is the API, not the MCP server.
Common confusion
Passing the user's identity downstream is fine; passing the user's token is not. A server can act for the user with its own token, issued for the upstream and tied to that user. OWASP's cheat sheet adds the client-side twin: "Use scoped, per-server credentials — never share tokens across servers."
In L2M
MCP gateway client tokens are minted by L2M, stored hashed, scoped to toolsetsToolset: A named, curated group of tools, drawn from several MCP servers and workflows, served at one MCP endpoint so each client sees only the tools it needs., and never sent upstream. Calls to a registered server use that server's own secret or OAuth connection, or, with delegated credentials, the user's own connection to that server.
Further reading
- MCP specification 2025-11-25: authorization (modelcontextprotocol.io)
- MCP security best practices: token passthrough (modelcontextprotocol.io)
- OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (owasp.org)